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Abstract for Thinking, Thought and Nous In Aristotle’s De Anima
Michael Wedin in his “Tracking Aristotle’s Nous’’ wishes to argue that the most 
plausible interpretation of De Anima, Book III, chapter 5 is . .that these chapters 
provide the essentials of a thoroughly finitistic account of individual noetic activity.” I 
want to argue that Wedin’s account is not the most plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s 
theory of individual noetic activity. I think Wedin’s interpretation misses a crucial 
distinction between the actualization of mind and the being of mind, insofar as he argues 
that mind is identical simpliciter with its object in the act of knowing when in fact, for 
Aristotle, mind is only identical with its object qua second actualization in the act of 
knowing but they are never identical in being, for example, the being of mind is such that 
it is capable of taking on any intelligible form in the act of knowledge) whereas the 
objects of knowledge are not capable of this. I will argue that making this crucial 
distinction helps us understand what Aristotle is saying in the notoriously difficult 
chapter 5 of Book ΠΙ.
Thinking, Thought and Nous in Aristotle’s De Anima
Michael Wedin in his “Tracking Aristotle’s Nous” wishes to argue that the most 
plausible interpretation of De Anima, Book III, chapter 5 is . .that these chapters provide 
the essentials of a thoroughly finitistic account of individual noetic activity.”1 I want to 
argue that Wedin’s account is not the most plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of 
individual noetic activity and give some indication why the criticisms I make allows us to 
better understand what is going on in chapter 5 of Book III of De Anima. I think Wedin’s 
interpretation misses a crucial distinction between the actualization of mind and the being 
of mind, insofar as he argues that mind is identical simpliciter with its object in the act of 
knowing when in fact, for Aristotle, mind is only identical with its object qua second 
actualization in the act of knowing but they are never identical in being, for example, the 
being of mind is such that it is potentially any intelligible form (i.e., it is capable of taking 
on any intelligible form in the act of knowledge) whereas the objects of knowledge are 
not capable of this. I will argue that making this crucial distinction helps us understand 
what Aristotle is saying in the notoriously difficult chapter 5 of Book III.
Wedin takes there to be six crucial characteristics of Nous in the De Anima,
1. Thinking is something like being affected (429a 14-15).
2. One can think of what one wishes (429a 17).
3. Actual thinking is produced by the object of thought 
(429a 13-14).
4. Mind is nothing actual until it thinks (429a 24).
5. Mind is identical with its object (430a 3-5).
6. Mind thinks itself (429b 9).
Wedin glosses number 6 as:
7. Whenever one actually thinks (i.e. when the mind is 
identical with the object of thought), then the mind 
thinks itself.2
1 Wedin, “Tracking Aristotle’s Nous,” in Aristotle’s De Anima in Focus, ed. Michael Durrant, Routledge, 
London, 1993, pg. 128.
2 Ibid., pgs. 131-132.
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Wedin then asks the question, “What sort of picture of mind underlies an account 
containing the features we have just discussed?”3 He answers with a theory of the mind 
that he calls M,
At t a thinks (noetically) of something P if, and only if, at t 
a ’s mind not only produces P but also produces itself by 
producing P.4
Wedin believes that this definition of mind fairly straightforwardly satisfies 4, 5 and 6. 
However, I am not so sure.
Aristotle makes clear in De Anima that two notions of actuality must be 
distinguished:
But we must make distinctions concerning potentiality and 
actuality; for at the moment we are speaking of them in an 
unqualified way. For there are knowers in that we should 
speak of a man as a knower because man is one of those 
who are knowers and have knowledge; then there are 
knowers in that we speak of the man who has knowledge of 
grammar as a knower.. .There is thirdly the man who is 
already contemplating, the man who is actually and in the 
proper sense knowing this particular A.5 
Wedin’s number 4 must be qualified since in only one sense of actuality, i.e., the sense in 
which someone is actually contemplating this particular A [second actuality], is Nous 
nothing actual before it thinks. In the other sense of actuality [first actuality], i.e., that 
sense analogous to the one in which someone has knowledge without necessarily 
contemplating it, Nous is actual in a person even though that person is not thinking of 
something in particular. It could be that there are stages to Nous’ actuality. For instance, 
it could be that one does not actually have Nous, in the sense of first actuality, until one is 
a member of a linguistic community, before which time one is not capable of thinking 
about anything. When the individual becomes a member of a linguistic community then
2
3 Ibid., pg. 133.
4 Ibid., pg. 133.
Nous is actual [first actuality] in him and this does not imply that he has Nous in its 
second actuality, i.e., he is not now thinking of anything. This is just like the case of the 
knower that Aristotle mentions. One begins by not knowing, one comes to have 
knowledge [first actuality] through teaching and learning and finally one can exercise that 
knowledge [second actuality].
This is important to the discussion because Wedin takes it that “.. .mind not only 
produces P but also produces itself by producing P.” However, if I am right this is not 
quite true and Wedin can at most conclude that, for Aristotle, Nous not only actualizes P 
but also actualizes itself [second actuality] by actualizing P. This seriously hinders 
Wedin’s interpretation of Nous because, given this, correct formulations of 4, 5 and 6 
become much more complicated than Wedin wants.
With regard to 5, we must qualify what Aristotle means when Wedin takes him to 
say “Mind is identical with its object.” For, if I am right, what we should conclude is 
only that Nous in second actuality is identical with its object. Clearly, Nous insofar as it 
is actualized in its first actuality is not identical with its object. For Nous in its first 
actuality is capable of thinking anything whatsoever (429al8), i.e., “.. .it must have no 
other nature than this, that it is potential,”5 6 whereas the objects of thought have no 
actuality similar to this, i.e., being capable of thinking anything whatsoever. Therefore, 
Nous manifested in its second actuality, i.e., in thinking of a particular object, is identical 
with the object of thought, but this does not mean that Nous generally is identical with the 
object of thought.
Aristotle is sensitive to this point, for in discussing whether the soul and body are 
one he says that “.. .while unity and being are so spoken of in many ways, that which is 
most properly spoken of is the actuality.”7 That is, the most proper sense of unity and 
being is actuality. Therefore, even though Nous and the object of thought are most 
properly actualized and, thus, most properly identical in second actuality this does not 
mean that Aristotle would say that they are identical in the strong sense Wedin wants.
5 Aristotle De Anima, 417a21-417b2. All my quotations from De Anima will be from Aristotle De Anima 
Books II and III, tr. D.W. Hamlyn, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1993.
6 Ibid., 429al9.
7 Ibid., 412b9.
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viz., identical simpliciter, or, as Aristotle would put it, “identical in being,” And this 
makes sense given what I have said above.
Similarly with Wedin’s number 6. It is not simply the case that for Aristotle Nous 
thinks itself in the sense that it brings itself into existence by thinking of an object. It is 
true that Nous actualizes itself [second actuality] when it thinks of an object, but Aristotle 
expressly denies that Nous, therefore, brings itself into existence. For example he says, 
“Again, the states of the intellectual part of the soul are not alterations, nor is there any
o
becoming of them.” And, “.. .that which has knowledge comes to contemplate, and this 
is either not an alteration (for the development of the thing is into itself and into actuality) 
or a different kind of alteration. For this reason it is not right to say that something which 
understands is altered when it understands, any more than a builder when he builds.”8 9 
Wedin takes number 3 from De Anima 429a 13-14 which says,
Now if thinking is akin to perceiving, it would be either 
being affected in some way by the object of thought or 
something else of this kind.
But the text continues,
It must then be unaffected, but capable of receiving the 
form, and potentially such as it, although not identical with 
it...
I think it is wrong for Wedin to read into passage number 3 that actual thinking is 
produced by the object of thought. Again, Wedin takes this to mean that since actual 
thinking and the object of thought are identical the production of the object of thought is 
clearly also the production of Nous and that Nous itself produces the object. However, as 
I argued before, Wedin is not careful enough in distinguishing what is “produced.” 
Nothing comes to be, i.e., there is no becoming, rather Nous “develops into its true self or 
actuality.” Both Wedin’s interpretation of Nous, with regard to numbers 1 and 2, face 
similar problems.
8 Aristotle Physics, 247bl. All my references to the Physics are from R.P. Hardie’s and R.K. Gaye’s 
translation in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Johnathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1984.
9 De Anima, 417b5-7.
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What I would like to do is quickly look at chapters 4 and 5 to show how the 
criticisms I have made of Wedin’s account help us better to understand what Aristotle’s 
account of Nous is, specifically insofar is it allows us to understand the role the prime 
mover qua pure actuality plays in Aristotle’s account of Nous.
There is a very interesting and illuminating passage - especially with regard to the 
discussion of Nous in De Anima - in book 12, chapter 9 of the Metaphysics. It is as 
follows,
Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought 
thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its 
thinking is a thinking on thinking.
But evidently knowledge and perception and 
opinion and understanding have always something else as 
their object, and themselves only by the way.. .We answer 
that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the 
productive sciences it is the substance or essence of the 
object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical sciences the 
definition or the act of thinking is the object. Since, then, 
thought and the object of thought are not different in the 
case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and 
its object will be the same, i.e., the thinking will be one 
with the object of its thought.10 
This passage is particularly interesting because almost the exact formulation arises at the 
end of book 4 of De Anima, where Aristotle says that, “.. .in the case of those things 
which have no matter, that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for 
contemplative knowledge and that which is known in that way are the same.”11 This is 
precisely the passage which Wedin interprets as 5, “Mind is identical with its object.” 
Aristotle never goes so far. Aristotle does conclude in the passage from the 
Metaphysics that I quoted above that “divine thought and its object will be the same” and
10 Aristotle Metaphysics, 1074b34-1075a5. Italics mine. All the translations from the Metaphysics are from 
W.D. Ross’ translation in The Complete works of Aristotle.
11 De Anima, 430a2.
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that this should be read in the sense that divine thought and its object are identical in 
being, i.e., “...it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks.” However, Aristotle 
never asserts thesis 5 the way Wedin interprets it, viz., that Nous is identical with its 
object in the sense that they have the same being, i.e., that Nous “produces” itself when it 
“produces” the thought of P. As I argued above, this is precisely what Aristotle denies.
Aristotle says that, “if thinking is akin to perceiving, it would be either being 
affected in some way by the object of thought or something else of this kind. It must then 
be unaffected, but capable of receiving the form, and potentially such as it, although not 
identical with it...” Here Aristotle is making a similar point to the one he makes in 
book ΙΠ, chapter 2, “The activity of the object of perception and of the sense is one and 
the same, although what it is for them to be such is not the same.”12 3 That is, in second 
actuality, sensation, and likewise Nous, are identical with their object, but are yet still 
different with regard to their being. Nous is identical to the object of thought in one 
sense, that of second actuality, but they are different in another sense, that of their being. 
However, this is not always true. In the case of divine thought there is no difference in 
being either. Divine thought just is the divinity itself. As Aristotle says in the passage 
from the Metaphysics I quoted, the sole object of divine thought is itself. But this does 
not hold in our case.
In our case, Aristotle says that we think of ourselves “only by the way.” This 
amounts to the claim that, it is true that we think ourselves in thought, but only insofar as, 
in us, second actuality of Nous is identical with the object of thought so when we think a 
particular thing we think the second actuality of Nous in us, but we do not think the being 
of Nous in us for the being of Nous in us is different from the being of the object of 
thought even when we are actively thinking of that object. This is because regardless 
whether we are actively thinking about something we are always potentially thinking 
about something else. This is the character of the being of Nous in us. It is actualized 
when we think of something, but it is still always potential insofar as it is capable of 
thinking about other objects. In other words, Nous is never fully actualized in us.
12 De Anima, 429al3-15.
13 De Anima, 425b26.
On the other hand, Nous is fully actualized in divine thought for divine thought is 
“pure actuality.” It thinks eternally of itself, i.e., it thinks of thinking itself, and nothing 
else. In this case, Nous and the object of Nous are identical in being as well as actuality.
How does this make the interpretation of chapter 5 of book ΠΙ any more 
understandable? In the space left, I should like to give a brief analysis of this difficult 
chapter.
I wish to analyze the chapter in three parts. First I will consider 430al0-13:
Since [just as] in the whole of nature there is something 
which is matter to each kind of thing (and this is what is 
potentially all of them), while on the other hand there is 
something else which is their cause and is productive by 
producing them all - these being related as an art to its 
material - so there must also be these differences in the 
soul.
This is clearly a difficult passage to interpret. Many take it to suggest that there are two 
parts to the intellect [as Wedin does.] First there is the passive intellect, that which is 
potentially all intelligible forms and then active intellect which “impresses” the forms 
upon the passive intellect. The active intellect is then taken to be what is discussed 
throughout the rest of the chapter as, e.g., that which is eternal, etc. I want to take a 
minimal reading of this passage and say that Aristotle, though admitting that there must 
be two components to the soul, one passive and the other active, this does not necessarily 
mean that there are two components to human intellect or Nous. I would think rather that 
given Aristotle’s use of the analogy between art and its material, this passage refers to 
something akin to passive intellect (the wax tablet on which nothing is written which 
Aristotle refers to in ch. 4) and its relation to knowledge or the first actualization of Nous. 
That is, just as art does not imply the exercise of art, e.g., being a builder does not 
necessarily imply one is now building, so what Aristotle refers to as the cause and 
producer need not refer to actual thinking, but only to knowledge or the ability to think. 
Active intellect is not akin to art, but rather to the artisan who is actually working.
7
Therefore, I think my minimalist reading of the passage makes better sense of Aristotle’s 
analogy.
Now I take it that in the rest of the chapter Aristotle begins to discuss something 
different than this division in the soul. Aristotle continues at 430al3-17,
And there is an intellect which is of this kind by becoming 
all things, and there is another which is so by producing all 
things, as a kind of disposition, like light, does; for in a way 
light too makes colours which are potential into actual 
colours. And this intellect is distinct, unaffected, and 
unmixed, being in essence activity.
Here I believe Aristotle is distinguishing between human intellect (human Nous) and 
divine intellect (divine Nous). It is human Nous which is capable of becoming all things. 
This is how Aristotle characterizes human Nous in many places, that which is capable of 
taking on any intelligible form whatsoever (429al8-19). This is to be contrasted with 
divine thought as Aristotle does at Metaphysics 1072b21-24, “For that which is capable 
of receiving the object of thought, i.e., the essence, is thought. But it is active when it 
possess this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine 
element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most 
pleasant and best.” This is the intellect which is distinct, unaffected, unmixed and being 
in essence activity. These qualities together cannot possibly pertain to human intellect 
insofar as the last, being in essence activity, is precisely not what human intellect is. 
Otherwise, as Aristotle indicates in the next passage, human thought would never cease - 
we should never not be thinking. (430a5) That which is essentially activity cannot 
possibly be potential with regard to something. So I think that in this passage Aristotle is 
at least making a distinction between human and divine Nous.
Chapter 5 concludes,
For that which acts is always superior to that which is 
affected, and the first principle to the matter. [Actual 
knowledge is identical with its object; but potential 
knowledge is prior in time in the individual but not prior
8
even in time in general]; and it is not the case that it 
sometimes thinks and at other times not. In separation it is 
just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But 
we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the 
passive intellect is perishable, and without this thinks 
nothing.
I believe it is clear that here as well Aristotle is referring directly to the divine intellect. 
For not only is it consider a first principle14 but it is not the case that the divine intellect 
sometimes thinks and at other times does not for its very essence is to think. Only divine 
intellect could fulfill the characteristics of intellect set out here, viz., be a first principle, 
think always and be immortal and eternal. At least it is clear that human intellect 
sometimes thinks and sometimes does not. And it is at least highly doubtful that 
individual human intellects are first principles.
14 “the first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, 
and it is in this sense a first principle.” Metaphysics, 1072MO-11.
9
